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This paper examines the magnitude and the sources of the expected shareholder gains in UK public to private transactions 
(PTPs) in the second wave from 1997-2003. Pre-transaction shareholders on average receive a premium of 40% and the 
share  price  reaction  to  the  PTP  announcement  is  about  30%.  The  main  sources  of  the  shareholder  wealth  gains  are 
undervaluation of the pre-transaction target firm, increased interest tax shields and incentive realignment. An expected 
reduction of free cash flows does not determine the premiums nor are PTPs a defensive reaction against a takeover.  
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In  the  Anglo-American  corporate  landscape,  the  public  corporation  is  believed  to  have  numerous 
advantages over its private counterpart. A stock exchange listing combined with the separation of ownership 
and  control  allows  access  to  capital  markets,  specialization  in  managerial  skills,  investors’  wealth 
diversification with liquid portfolios, a higher degree of media exposure, risk diversification by founders and 
entrepreneurs, the use of stock price-based remuneration packages, and so on. However, this concept of the 
corporation has a major drawback: an unaccountable management could create substantial agency costs leading 
to corporate value destruction. The size of the inefficiencies induced by agency conflicts led Jensen (1989) to 
predict that the eclipse of the public corporation was near. This provocative claim was an exaggeration but, in 
the  1980s,  a  first  important  wave  of  leveraged  public  to  private  transactions  (PTPs)
1  with  a  value  of 
approximately USD 250 billion occurred in the US (Opler and Titman, 1993). The phenomenon traversed the 
Atlantic, with the first UK LBO seeing daylight in 1985 (Wright, Chiplin, Robbie and Albrighton, 2000). 
Although  much smaller  in  scale, activity in the UK market for PTPs transactions kept pace with the US, 
reaching a peak in 1989.  
Most that is currently known about public to private transactions results from US research analyzing 
US samples covering the 1980s (see Jensen, 1993 for a review). However, while a vibrant, and economically 
important PTP market has developed in the UK from the late 1990s onwards, there has to date been virtually no 
systematic  research  on  the  sources  of  shareholder  wealth  gains  of  UK  going-private  transactions.  It  is 
questionable  whether  this  US  evidence  on  the  sources  of  wealth  gains  from  leveraged  public  to  private 
transactions (PTPs) is generalizable to the UK for the following reasons. First, the nature and extent of debt 
financing in US PTPs differs substantially from UK deals. Whereas US LBOs are (and were especially in the 
1980s) partially financed with junk bonds, privately placed mezzanine was and still is the standard in the UK 
(Toms  and  Wright,  2004).  Since  these  two  sources  of  funds  have  different  characteristics  (in  terms  of 
flexibility, interest rates, maturity, covenants and gearing levels), it is not unlikely that the choice of financing 
between the two will influence all phases of a PTP. Also, the debt levels associated with UK transactions 
(across the 1980s and 90s) are generally lower than the gearing ratio in US deals. Second, while tax motives 
have been shown to be a very important source of wealth gains in US, it unclear whether this result can be 
extrapolated  to  the  UK  given  that  the  tax  laws  differ.  Third,  the  US  market  for  corporate  control  counts 
relatively more hostile takeovers than the UK market. Hence, the takeover defense hypothesis as a reason for 
PTPs is less likely to hold in the UK. Fourth, Toms and Wright (2004) argue that UK venture capital and 
buyout markets have traditionally been more closely linked than in the US. Consequently, public to private 
activity  in  the  UK  has  focused  more  on  growth  opportunities,  whereas  US  LBOs  have  occurred  more 
frequently in mature, cash-rich industries. Last but not least, whereas US state regulation has been able to 
stringently regulate unsolicited takeover activity, the UK system has preferred self-regulation (the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers), thus favouring the unrestricted functioning of market forces (Miller, 2000).  For all 
                                                




these reasons, a study on the second PTP wave in the UK is compelling and provides an important contribution 
to the PTP and LBO/MBO literature.  
Our sample includes all 177 of the UK PTPs from 1997 (the start of the second wave) until 2003. 
These leveraged deals can be subdivided into management buyouts (MBOs), management buyins (MBIs) and 
institutional buyouts (IBOs).
2 In a typical UK MBO, the incumbent management seeks institutional support 
from private equity firms to purchase a major stake in the firm and to fund the transaction which aims at taking 
the firm private (Wright et al., 1991). IBOs (also called Bought Deals or Finance Purchases) are deals where 
the bidding group consists solely of institutional investors and private equity houses. When the management 
stays on, its performance is rewarded with a modest equity stake and/or an equity ratchet
3. In terms of equity 
ownership, what separates MBOs from IBOs, is whether the management team gained its equity stakes through 
being part of the bidding group (MBO), or as a component of a remuneration package (IBO). In an MBI, a 
team of outside managers or entrepreneurs purchases (most of) the equity. The premium for the average UK 
PTP amounts to about 40%. In addition, the market reaction to the announcement of a PTP transaction as 
measured by the cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) over an 11 day event window centred around the 
announcement day, are also high at about 30%. These premiums and wealth effects  are not dissimilar to the 
US findings.  
We reach the following results: an important source of expected shareholder wealth gains (as captured 
by the premiums and CAARs) is the undervaluation of the target firms’ share prices over a one-year period 
prior  to  the  first  PTP  announcement.  The  higher  premiums  offered  for  such  a  firm  reflect  the  potential 
additional value that will be generated once the firm reaches its private status. This effect is stronger for MBOs 
and IBOs than for MBIs, which may arise due to differences in asymmetric information. In contrast to US 
research, there is no relation between a target firm’s tax burden prior to the PTP and the expected wealth gains. 
However, the fact that higher premiums are paid for firms with low leverage does provide some support for the 
tax benefits hypothesis. The unused debt capacity is likely to create a large additional tax shield.  
 The potential for increased incentive realignment in the private firm is also an important determinant 
of the shareholder wealth gains as both the premium and CAARs are higher for firms with lower levels of 
managerial  ownership.  We  also  report  evidence  supporting  the  control  hypothesis:  in  firms  with  stronger 
outside blockholders, the premiums and CAARs are lower. This negative relation is especially strong in firms 
with monitoring by corporations as pre-PTP shareholders. This supports the fact that in firms monitored by this 
type  of  outside  shareholders,  there  is  less  scope  of  operating  performance  improvements  in  the  post-PTP 
period.  
The free cash flow hypothesis is not sustained as firms are not taken private to reduce high free cash 
flows, which is consistent with most US studies. Prior takeover interest in the firm does not lead managers to 
pay  more  to  take  their  firms  private  in  order to pre-empt  potential raiders. Not  surprisingly,  when at  the 
announcement of a takeover, multiple bidders emerge, the shareholder wealth gains are higher.  
                                                
2 In the US literature, IBOs and MBIs are usually called Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs).  
3  Performance  contingent  contract  operating  as  an  incentive  device  enabling  management  to  increase  its  equity 




The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the worldwide evolution of PTPs 
while Section 3 embeds the hypotheses in the literature. Section 4 discusses the sample selection, lists the data 
sources  and  presents  the  descriptive  statistics.  Section  5  explains  the  methodology.  Section  6  shows  the 
premiums  and  CAARS  while  Section  7  discusses  the  results  from  the  cross-sectional  regression  models. 
Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. International trends in public to private transactions 
 
The  US  economy  of  the  1980s  was  characterized  by  extensive  (hostile)  corporate  takeovers  and 
restructuring. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) state that 57% of US quoted firms were then takeover targets or 
were restructured. Jensen (1991) argues that during this period, LBOs and MBOs functioned as the necessary 
catalyst for change to reduce the excess capacity in ‘complacent corporate America’. The US going-private 
buyout  market  developed  from  less than $1 billion in 1979, to a peak of more than $60 billion in 1988. 
However, the culmination of this LBO wave was associated with many bankruptcies and fierce public and 
political resistance (anti-takeover legislation) such that activity slowed down abruptly, to less than $4 billion in 
1990 (Kaplan and Stein, 1993). In the ten years time frame of the ‘deal decade’, $1.3 trillion in total asset value 
had changed hands (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that the 1980-style deals 
are not necessary anymore, because the focus on shareholder value has been institutionalized by corporations 
since. Nevertheless, from 1997 onwards, a modest rise in US PTPs can be observed (see Figure 1a). Since 
2000, PTPs have been motivated by the decline of the stock markets which seems to make the sale of public 
equity too costly as a source of funds. Small companies in particular experienced strong adverse effects from 
low trading volumes (Kuhn Capital, 2003). More importantly though, the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is said to increase the costs of a listing substantially.   
[Insert Figures 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d about here] 
 
Although smaller in scale, the activity in the UK public to private market kept pace with the US and the 
first wave culminated in 1989 (Figure 1b). Public controversy over increased hostility in transactions that year 
induced the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers to adopt new rules regarding the procedures in PTPs (Wright et 
al.,1991). As in the US, the sudden drop in deals after 1989 made it seem as if the public to private transaction 
had already outlived its short life. Nevertheless, a new wave of public to private transactions started in 1997. 
Explanations for the second PTP wave generally emphasize the increased presence of private equity and debt 
financiers, target shareholder support (e.g. through irrevocable undertakings), the increased use of inducement 
fees and ‘hard’ exclusivity agreements, and the expectation that 100% of the shares can be acquired (e.g. 
through squeeze-out provisions) (Ashurst et al., 2002; Davis and Day, 1998; CMBOR, 2002). However, a 
much more important reason seems to be the disregard for small companies by institutional investors. For 
example, upon going private, Mr. Ainscough, CEO of Wainhomes Plc, said: “We feel unloved and unwanted. 
There has been a lack of investor appetite for small company shares over the last two or three years. This made 




reasons  for  going  public  in  the  first  place”  (FT,  March  4,  1999).  The  lack of liquidity  and  the need  for 
expansion capital as a consequence of the cut-off of institutional equity finance, drove small companies into the 
arms of private equity firms
4. The present PTP wave culminated in 1999-2000 in terms of deal numbers, but 
the value of PTP transactions remains high, reaching a peak of £7.9 billion in 2004. As increasingly larger 
corporations were being targeted, the mean deal value rose from £169 million in 1999 to £793 million in 2004 
(CMBOR, 2005). 
    As in the UK, PTP activity in Continental Europe was low in the 1980s compared to the second PTP 
wave of the late 1990s (Figure 1c). In absolute terms, the European market for PTP transactions is still small 
for the following reasons. First, Continental European countries have fewer listed companies. Second, fewer 
private equity houses consider undertaking a potentially risky and costly PTP. Moreover, the potential for 
exiting an investment through a flotation is more limited (Sudarsanam, 2003: 278). Third, culture may still also 
play a mayor role in the functioning and sophistication of European financial markets. For example, ‘German 
managers generally try to avoid the hassle associated with a quotation’, while ‘Swiss and Italian companies that 
do obtain a listing are generally to proud of it to even rationally consider going private’ (CMBOR, 2002). 
Finally, the legal and fiscal infrastructure is traditionally not as favorable to PTPs as in the UK. However, 
recently implemented changes in regulation may stimulate the European PTP market.
5 
An important development in Japan from late 2000 was the appearance of buyouts of whole listed 
companies, which accounted for a tenth of the deals in the 2000-02 period (Figure 1d). This trend increased in 
2003 with the completion of six public to private transactions (Wright, Kitamura and Burrows, 2005). With a 
large proportion of companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange trading at or below book value, there would 
appear to be scope for significant further opportunities for public to private transactions. The average price to 
book ratio on the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell from just under 3 in 1990 to under 1.5 in 1997 and has been 
fluctuating around this level since then. However, the absence of minority squeeze-out provisions presents 




Essentially, several sources of wealth gains may motivate the going-private decision. These are: tax 
savings,  reduction  of  agency  costs  (due  to  incentive  realignment,  control  concentration  or  free  cash  flow 
reduction), wealth transfers from stakeholders to shareholders, transaction costs reduction, takeover defenses, 
corporate undervaluation. In this section, we formulate these hypotheses and embed them in the literature.  
                                                
4 Financial Times of June 11, 1999 
5 For instance, the transparency, shareholder protection, takeover rules and development of risk capital as provided for 
in Italy’s recent Company Law reform allow for more flexibility in structuring private equity deals (see Ulissi (2000) 
and  Lovells  (2003)).  The  new  Dutch  Fiscal  Unity  law  of  1/1/2003,  enables  acquisition  vehicles  of  private  equity 
investors to allocate the losses of high interest payments from acquisition-related leverage to the operations of the 
target. The new German Takeover Act prohibits the frustration of a PTP deal by the target board (Ashurst et al., 2003). 
Also, the German tax reform eliminates the corporate tax on disposal of shares. On 2/1/2003, the French Minister of 
Economics declared that the French usury law does not apply to corporate bonds, high yield issues, or debt instruments 





3.1 The tax benefit hypothesis 
As  the  vast  majority  of  PTP  transactions  take  place  with  a  substantial  increase  in  leverage,  the 
increase  in  interest  deductions  constitutes  an  important  source  of  expected  wealth  gains.  Interest  tax 
deductibility on the new loans constitutes a major tax shield increasing the pre-recapitalization value.
6 Clearly, 
the extent to which tax benefits play a role depends on the fiscal regime and the marginal tax rates a company 
is subject to.  Kaplan  (1989b)  estimates  the  tax  benefits  of  US PTPs to be between 21% and 72% of the 
premium paid to shareholders to take the company private for the first half of the 1980s. Still, he adds that ‘a 
public company arguably could obtain many of the tax benefits without going private’. Lowenstein (1985: 759) 
is critical and calls for a restriction of the tax benefits (‘truffles from the tax man’) in LBOs, judging that tax-
related benefits ‘are so large as to dispense the need to create the other, real gains’, a claim supported by 
Frankfurter and Gunay (1993).  
    Under the tax hypothesis, firms with high tax bills benefit from going private, mainly because the 
large  amount  of  debt  used  to  finance  the  transaction  creates  a  considerable  additional  tax  shield  which 
augments the value of the pre-recapitalization firm. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The shareholder wealth gains from a PTP are positively related to high tax levels and low 
leverage ratios of the pre-transaction target firms. 
 
In a competitive market for corporate control, the tax benefits are predictable and hence may be 
appropriated by pre-buyout investors, leaving no tax-related incentives for the post-buyout investors to take a 
company private. 
 
3.2 The agency costs-related hypotheses 
    From  the  basics  of  agency  theory,  three  important  hypotheses  underlie  the  motives  of  public to 
private transactions: incentive realignment, control and free cash flow.  
 
 The incentive realignment hypothesis 
The insights of Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) on the divergence of interests between 
managers and stockholders in a joint stock company are formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976). When 
manager-entrepreneurs are also the sole residual claimants, they extract pecuniary rents and non-pecuniary
7 
benefits. The optimal mix follows from a deliberation of the marginal costs and utilities associated with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies  in  other  jurisdictions  than  the  French.  Also,  since  2002  the  possibility  for  conditional  bids  for  quoted 
companies have been expanded (Lovells, 2003). 
6 For the US LBOs in the 1980s, Kaplan (1989b) mentions asset step-ups as another source of tax-related benefits. In 
this procedure, the tax basis of the pre-transaction assets is inflated to the “appraised fair market value”. The premium 
is attributed to goodwill on the seller’s books, which leads to tax deductions via goodwill amortization. 
7 These non-pecuniary (also called non-marketable perquisites or private benefits) are not transferable and are investor 
specific. Possible benefits could be the reputation or ‘psychic’ value of being in control (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), 




type of benefit. When managers sell a portion of the residual claims to outsiders, the marginal costs of the non-
pecuniary benefits decrease as they will bear only a fraction  of  those  costs.  Consequently, managers may 
increase their private benefits (e.g. shirking of effort) which decreases the firm’s value. The need to realign the 
incentives of managers with those of shareholders is frequently mentioned as an important factor in PTPs. For 
instance, Kaplan (1989a) reports a median increase in equity ownership of 4.41% for the two top officers, and 
of 9.96% for the other managers in LBOs. Under the incentive realignment hypothesis, the reunification of 
ownership and control will improve the incentive structure and is expected to increase managerial effort to 
maximize firm value. Hence: 
  
Hypothesis 2: The shareholder wealth gains in MBOs and IBOs are negatively related to managerial equity 
ownership in the pre-transaction firm. 
 
The effects of the incentive realignment hypothesis at higher levels of managerial ownership are 
contested because entrenchment effects may render management - even in the wake of poor performance - 
immune to board restructuring and may delay corporate restructuring (Franks et al., 2001).  
  
The control hypothesis  
    Grossman and Hart (1980) describe the free-rider problem associated with monitoring managerial 
actions in public corporations with a dispersed shareholder structure. As the investment in monitoring by an 
individual shareholder becomes a public good for all shareholders, individual shareholders owning small equity 
stakes may underinvest in monitoring activities. The presence of strong ownership concentration involving 
closer monitoring by outside shareholders prior to the PTP implies that fewer wealth gains from going-private 
are expected as the pre-transaction firm is less likely to suffer from high agency costs. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis  3:  The  expected  shareholder  wealth  gains  from  PTPs  are  negatively  related  to  the  degree  of 
concentration of equity claims in the hands of monitoring outside shareholders. 
 
As different classes of ownership have different monitoring abilities, we expect a strongly negative 
relation between wealth gains and the presence of corporations, and individuals or families controlling large 
share stakes. In the UK, there has traditionally been little evidence  of institutional investor activism although  
there  are  currently  signs  of  the  opposite  (Crespi  and  Renneboog,  2002).  Surveys  reveal  that  many  UK 
institutions have established voting policies (for examples, see Mallin (1997)).
8 Furthermore, the PIRC-surveys 
since 1999 on institutional voting trends concludes that overall proxy voting levels have increased to over 50%.   
                                                
8 As a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for potential voting pact formation by institutions, the casting of votes 
at annual meetings is considered. Legally, many corporate issues are subject to a shareholder vote: e.g. declaration of 
the dividend (after board recommendation), transactions involving the acquisition or disposal of assets worth 25% or 
more  of  the  company’s  net  assets,  removal  of  directors,  certain  alterations  in  the  capital  structure  (e.g.  share 
repurchases), non-application of the pre-emption rights, directors’ remuneration, etc. For an exhaustive enumeration 
see Stapledon (1996:84). The evolution of institutional voting is described in the following studies: only 20% of 





The free cash flow hypothesis 
Free cash flow (FCF) is usually defined as the cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects 
that have a positive net present value (NPV) when discounted at a relevant cost of capital. Using empirical 
results  on  executive  remuneration  and  corporate  performance,  Murphy  (1985)  argues  that  managers  have 
incentives to retain resources and grow the firm beyond its optimal size - so-called ‘empire building’ - which is 
in direct conflict with shareholders’ interests. This problem is most severe in cash-rich industries with low 
growth prospects. By exchanging debt for equity, managers credibly precommit to pay out future cash flows 
rather than retaining them to invest in negative NPV projects. The increased risk of default resulting from the 
recapitalization of the LBOs constitutes a motivating factor to make the firm more efficient. Jensen (1986:325) 
states that ‘many of the benefits in going-private and leveraged buyout transactions seem to be due to the 
control  function  of  debt’.  In  the  carrot  and  stick  theory  of  Lowenstein  (1985),  the  carrot  represents  the 
increased managerial share ownership that allows managers to reap more of the benefits from their efforts. The 
stick appears when firms borrow heavily in order to effect this incentive alignment, which forces the managers 
to efficiently run the company to avoid default (Cotter and Peck, 2001). 
Under the free cash flow hypothesis, high leverage associated with PTPs will reduce wasting FCF by 
bonding managers to pay out more cash flows to service the debt. This will be especially beneficial to firms 
that generate large amounts of FCF, on which there are little ‘hard’ claims by outside investors. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The expected shareholder wealth gains from PTPs are positively related to levels of free 
cash flows in the pre-transaction firm. 
 
However, relying on debt to motivate managers may induce the agency costs of debt as debt gives managers 
the incentive to substitute low-risk assets for high-risk assets (an asset-substitution problem).  
 
3.3 The transaction costs hypothesis 
    DeAngelo et al. (1984) note that the costs of maintaining a stock exchange listing are very high. 
From proxy statements they infer that the costs of public ownership, registration, listing and other stockholder 
servicing costs, are about $100,000 per annum. Perpetuity-capitalized at a 10% discount rate, this implies that 
at least a value increase of USD 1 million should be generated by the PTP. Other US estimates of servicing 
costs mentioned in their paper range from $30,000 to $200,000, excluding management time.  
For UK companies with a market capitalization of GBP 100 million, the admission fee to the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) amounted to GPB 43,700 in 2003 with an annual listing fee of GBP 6,280. These costs 
vary with the size of the corporation and the type of market on which it is listed. For example for large firms, 
the direct costs of a listing on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) are only half those of the official 
                                                                                                                                                        
(MVA (1998)). Pension funds exercise voting rights more frequently with 44% in 1993 (ISC (1993)) and 59% in 
1996 (Mallin (1997)). The vast majority of insurance companies votes: 70% exercised voting rights in 1993 (ISC 





9 In addition, the indirect costs of a listing on the AIM are likely to be much lower than those of a 
listing  on  the  official  market  because  the  listing  and  disclosure  requirements  are  lower  on  the  AIM.
10 
Depending  on  the  size  of  the company,  Benoit (1999) reports that  for UK quoted firms, the fees paid to 
stockbrokers, registrars, lawyers, merchant bankers and financial PR companies, as well as the exchange fee 
and the auditing, printing and distribution of accounts, can even amount to GBP 250,000.
11   
In short, the transaction costs hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private are largely 
the result of the elimination of the direct and indirect costs associated with maintaining a stock exchange 
listing. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis  5:  The  shareholder  wealth  gains  from  PTPs  are  positively  related  to  the  cost  savings  from 
eliminating the stock market listing.  
 
3.4 The takeover defense hypothesis  
    Lowenstein  (1985)  reports  that  some  corporations  have  gone  private  via  an  MBO  ‘as  a  final 
defensive measure against a hostile shareholder or tender offer’. Afraid of losing their jobs when the hostile 
suitor takes control, management may take the company private. Stulz (1988) constructs a model in which 
pressures from the market for corporate control interact with managerial ownership and finds a curvilinear 
relationship with firm value. The high levels of equity ownership of firms where management is entrenched 
make  it  unlikely  that  these firms are taken  over  by  outside parties (Jensen and  Ruback, 1983).  However, 
maintaining control over the company can put management in the predicament of having too much of their 
personal wealth invested in the firm (Halpern et al., 1999; Hubbard and Palia, 1995). In short, the takeover 
defense hypothesis suggests that the premiums in PTPs reflect the fact that the management team may intend to 
buy out the other shareholders in order to insulate itself against an unsolicited takeover. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The expected premiums from PTPs are positively related to takeover pressure from the market 
for corporate control. 
 
3.5 The undervaluation hypothesis 
As a firm is a portfolio of projects, there may be asymmetric information between management and 
outsiders about the maximum value that can be realized with the existing assets. It is possible that management, 
which has superior private information, perceives that the share price is undervalued in relation to the true 
                                                
9 The Alternative Investment Market was started June 19, 1995, to facilitate the trading in the securities of smaller, 
growing companies, which are unable to meet the full criteria for the admission to the official list of the UK Listing 
Authority  or  for  whom  a  less  rigid  regulatory  environment  is  considered  more  appropriate.  In  July  2003,  706 
companies were trading on AIM, with a total market capitalization of ￿12,699 million.  
10  An  elaborate  enumeration  of  these  differences  can  be  enquired  at  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  or  found  on 
www.Londonstockexchange.com. 
11 Some UK CEOs estimate that these costs may even be higher: Roy Hill, the CEO of Liberfabrica, estimated, just 
after his company was acquired in 1999, these costs at GBP 400,000. Likewise, Jurek Piasecki, CEO of Goldsmiths put 




potential of the firm. This problem may be exacerbated where listed corporations, especially smaller ones, find 
it troublesome to use the equity market to fund expansion, as it may be difficult to attract the interest of  
institutional shareholders and fund managers. The lack of interest in such shares creates illiquidity and implies 
that they are likely to remain lowly valued which provides an impetus to go private. If institutions attempt to 
sell shares in firms that experience thin trading, it is likely to have a noticeable effect on the share price which 
will reduce the value of any remaining holdings. There is some anecdotal and empirical evidence from the UK 
for this perceived undervaluation by management.
12  
Lowenstein  (1985)  argues  that,  when  management  is  the  acquiring  party,  it  may  employ  specific 
accounting techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (see also Schadler and Karns, 1990). By 
manipulating  dividends,  refusing  to  meet  with  security  analysts  or  even  deliberately  depressing  earnings, 
managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO or IBO. Still, DeAngelo 
(1986) finds no evidence of systematic manipulation of pre-buyout accounting data by incumbent management. 
Both Harlow and Howe (1993) and Kaestner and Liu (1996) report that MBOs are preceded by significant 
abnormal  share  purchases  by  insiders,  whereas  outsider-induced  buyouts  are  not.  They  suggest  that  this 
confirms that pre-buyout insider trading is associated with private managerial information. Alternatively, it is 
possible  that  specialized  outsiders  (like  institutions  or  private  equity  investors)  realize  that  a  firm  has 
substantial  unrealized  locked-up  value  which  incentivizes  them  to  buy  a  toehold  stake  followed  by  a 
management or institutional buy-in.  
The  undervaluation hypothesis states the management or an LBO specialist are able to pay higher 
premiums in a PTP when the pre-transaction firm is underperforming. Likewise, higher CAARs at the PTP 
announcement may reflect that the market incorporates the information that the private firm will be able to find 
an alternative higher-valued use for the firm’s assets. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis  7:  The  expected  shareholder  wealth  gains  from  PTPs  are  positively  related  to  the  degree  of 
undervaluation.   
 
3.6 The wealth transfer hypothesis 
There  are  three  main  mechanisms  through  which  a  firm  can  transfer  wealth  from  bondholders  to 
stockholders: (i) by an unexpected increase in the risk of investment projects or (ii) by (large increases in) 
dividend payments, or (iii) by an unexpected issue of debt of higher or equal seniority. In PTPs, the third 
mechanism in particular can lead to substantial bondholder wealth expropriation. Asquith and Wizman (1990), 
Cook et al. (1992) and Warga and Welch (1993) show that bondholders with covenants offering low protection 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the executive chairman of Wainhomes, who, upon the announcement of taking the company private, estimated the 
costs of maintaining a listing at GBP 1 million (Financial Times, August 31, 1999). 
12 For example, the chief executive of Allied Textiles stated that the market was not reflecting the intrinsic value of the 
company and the chairman of the building firm Ward, claimed that the housing boom had not been reflected in the 
company’s share price (Financial Times, 2000). Weir, et al. (2005b) use data on perceived and actual undervaluation 
prior to going to private, controlling for other factors, to identify the importance of undervaluation in the PTP decision. 
They  also  find  that  undervalued  firms  had  relatively  high  institutional  shareholdings,  suggesting  that  the  buyout 
provides institutions with a means of exiting firms with poor market valuation, particularly during a time of limited 




against corporate restructuring lose some percentage of their investment. Still, Amihud (1989) explains that the 
wealth transfer does not represent a loss for bondholders, but is rather a recuperation of the protection which 
was greater than was originally contracted for. Unfortunately, we will not be able to test this hypothesis due to 
the fact that our sample does not contain a sufficient number of firms with traded bonds, which is not unusual 
in the UK. 
The empirical literature has paid much less attention to wealth transfers other than those related to 
bondholders. Shleifer and  Summers  (1988)  suggest  that  new investors in takeovers can break the implicit 
contracts between the firm and stakeholders, like employees by reducing employment and wages. Nevertheless, 
Weston et al. (1998) note that such hostility against employees is not observed in PTPs, although there is some 
evidence of large falls in employment after adjustment for industry effects in both the US and UK (Kaplan, 
1989a; Smith, 1990; Harris, Siegel and Wright, 2005).  
 
 
4. Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology 
   
4.1 Sample selection and data sources 
    We  retrieved  all  181  UK  public  to  private  transactions  completed  between  January  1997  until 
February 2003 from the database of the Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR), which comprises 
the  European  population  of  leveraged  buyouts  and  buyins  and  does  not  have  a  lower  size  threshold  for 
inclusion. We excluded 4 firms due to data availability
13 and hence retain a sample of 177 firms. In addition to 
the  firm  name,  the  year  of  deal  completion and  the  acquirer,  the  CMBOR database on these transactions 
contains data on deal value, firm activities, the financial structure underlying the transaction and certain post-
transaction  variables.  We  supplemented  these  data  by  collecting  accounting  information,  bid  details,  the 
ownership structure and share price data from the following sources. Accounting data were gathered in the first 
instance from Extel cards (Thomson Research) and subsequently from the Worldscope database (LexisNexis). 
Where these two databases contained incomplete information, we consulted the annual reports. The details of 
the PTP bids were collected from Mergerstat reports which comprise the contextual anecdote on each buyout, a 
description of the business operations of the target and a financial summary on both firm and deal. These 
reports  were complemented  with information  from  the offer documents collected from Thomson Mergers, 
information from Securities Data Company (SDC), and press articles in the Financial Times over a period up to 
five years prior to each PTP transaction. We verified the data and eliminated inconsistencies by consulting the 
Regulatory  News  Service  (RNS)  announcements  provided  by  UK-Wire  Ltd.  Access  to  the  databases  was 
granted by Deloitte Corporate Finance (Amsterdam). 
                                                
13 Doncasters Plc is based in England but its shares were traded on a foreign exchanges (not on the London Stock 
Exchange); Charnos Plc only delisted its preference shares; Crown Sports Plc did not go private after the hostile buy-in 
attempt, but made a settlement with the suitor; Locker Group Plc delisted from the Official List 6 months before its 




Data on beneficial equity ownership stakes held by the management and by outside shareholders were 
collected from the last annual reports prior to the PTP.
14 All press articles on the 177 sample firms in the 
Financial Times for the five years leading up to the buyout transaction were collected to find data on flotations, 
restructurings,  earnings  warnings  and  CEO  turnover.  We  complemented  these  data  using  the  Chairman’s 
Statements in annual reports and the offer documents. If no information was found in the Financial Times or in 
the annual reports, we assumed that a flotation, restructuring, earnings warning, or CEO removal did not take 
place.  
Share prices adjusted for dividends and stock splits as well as the market capitalization by firm were 
collected from DataStream. From this database, we also downloaded the three-month Treasury Bill rate and the 
FTSE All Shares Index. Our final sample of 177 PTPs is larger than most US studies (with exception of the 
studies by Goh et al. (2002) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989)). Also, while some authors restrict their sample only 
to the larger transactions (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a; Amihud, 1989), our study does not have a size bias.  
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
   
Accounting and share price based measures 
The summary statistics on accounting-based measures and share price performance are displayed in 
Table 1 for every type of transaction. The size of the average firm measured by total assets amounts to GBP 
200.7 million. While average size is similar to that of US LBOs in the Kaplan (1989a) sample, our median size 
is substantial lower. Throughout the 1980s, the asset size of firms going private steadily increased in the US, 
culminating in the USD 25 billion LBO of RJR Nabisco in 1989. The largest firm in our sample is MEPC Plc, 
with an asset size of roughly GBP 4 billion. In order to successfully complete the larger deals, sophisticated 
financial engineering techniques are imperative
15. Consequently, large firms are more likely to be targeted by 
institutional  buyers  with  specialized  financial  engineering  capabilities,  rather  than  by  management  teams, 
which Table 1 confirms. The average debt-equity ratio amounts to 34.5%. Firms retain 11% of their assets in 
cash or cash equivalents.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Our sample firms have a  return on assets (ROA) of 3.7% but there are significant differences by type 
of deal (Table 1). Firms with negative accounting returns, indicating an underperforming management, are 
more likely to be subject to an MBI. IBOs focus on better performing firms which have on average an ROA of 
5.7%.  Panel  A  of  Table  2  shows  that  the  share  price  returns  of  UK  PTP  candidates  have  substantially 
underperformed  the  market,  especially  in  the  peak  years  of  the  equity  boom  (1998-9).  This  suggests  that 
                                                
14 In accordance with section 325 of the Companies Act 1985, directors are required to notify the Register of Director’s 
Interests of their holdings and publish all their interests and those held by their immediate families (including other 
affiliated persons within the meaning of section 346 of the Companies Act 1985) in the annual report. Under sections 
198 to 208 of the Companies Act 1985, firms are also required to publish the identity and holdings of all substantial 
shareholders with an equity stake over 3 percent. 




MBOs,  MBIs  and  IBOs  have  a  disciplinary  nature
16.  However,  an  alternative  interpretation  is  that  these 
corporate control transactions are merely a reaction to the undervaluation of the target firms’ shares. This is 
especially likely for small cap firms, which, on average, underperformed the market in the 1990s by 6% per 
year,
17 only to revive in 1999. One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the decreasing institutional interest 
in small caps due to consolidation in the fund management industry (CMBOR, 2002). Barred from equity 
funding, small, listed companies experienced considerable problems to gain access to growth capital to fund 
acquisitions or organic expansion. Private equity firms have taken advantage of this need for funds by taking 
undervalued firms private. The returns made by shareholders in the process, reattracted institutional interest 
towards the end of 1999.  
Panel B of Table 2 compares the market capitalization of the 44 sample firms floated since 1993 at the 
flotation date, and the market capitalization based on the offer price at the PTP announcement. On average, 
these firms lost GBP 382.2 million or 12.8% of their value at flotation. Some subsamples managed to generate 
a positive share price return (4.8% in 1999, 8.8% in 2000, 3.7% in 2001), but even here the annualized returns 
are small.  
 
Industry composition 
Our sample contains companies from the wider business spectrum. Practically half of the deals in 1998 
took place in the business services sector, representing about 25% of PTP value that year. In 1999, the business 
services sector again broke records in terms of number of deals, although the average value remained modest. 
Roughly 40% of the MBO transactions took place in two sectors: manufacturing and business services. In 
1999, manufacturing accounted for the largest share of total deal value, followed by retail distribution. MBIs 
account for more than one-third of all deals done in retail distribution, a sector characterized by high cash 
generation and stable competition. In 2000, the property sector experienced the largest deal observed so far 
with the ￿3.5 billion IBO of MEPC plc. In value terms, the sector represents nearly a third of total transactions, 
but in terms of number of deals only accounts for 20% of the total PTP activity. The takeover battle for 
Hillsdown Plc was the second largest deal in 2000 and emphasizes the importance of the manufacturing sector 
among PTPs. After 2000, the total value of the deals decreased in this sector, but it still remained in second 
place.  Few  PTP  deals  have  been  completed in  the financial  sector,  but Willis Corroon’s  Plc management 
buyout  of  ￿851  million  was  a  substantial  transaction.  Few  high-tech  firms  went  private  after  economic 
conditions changed radically when the bubble burst in 2000. Contrary to our expectations, more deals were 
completed in this sector before the bubble rather than after. It is remarkable that IBOs, representing merely 
12.5% of the full sample, account for one-third of all transactions in the high-tech sector.
18 
 
                                                
16 The executive board of Sears Plc for example, was said to have a “shocking disregard for shareholder value” (see FT 
of January 21,1999) and many firms were taken private with the motivation to be restructured away from the public 
arena.  
17 Financial Times of June 5, 1999 
18 This may be related to the notion of ‘busted-techs’ where listed technology corporations encounter control problems 
with existing management and need to undergo a buy-out to enable greater control to be exercised (Wright, Hoskisson, 





    Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of our PTPs, as well as presents data on the company histories 
for the five years preceding the event. Following previous studies (e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2003), a 
transaction is classified as hostile when the board of the target rejects the first offer. Panel A reveals that 7.3% 
of the PTPs were hostile, which is largely due to the fact that about a third of MBIs were opposed by the target 
board.
19 Private equity firms try to avoid hostile transactions as they frequently result in the loss of company 
specific  information  and  skills  if  the  incumbent  management  departs.
20  In  certain  IBOs,  the  continuing 
involvement of the executive directors is sometimes an explicit condition in the offer.
21  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
    Bidder competition involves a long-standing debate regarding PTPs. In order to protect minority 
shareholders, Lowenstein (1985) argued for its institutionalization, while Amihud (1989) concluded that this 
would deter possible buyers from making a bid in the first place. Paul Myners
22, former head of fund manager 
Gartmore, recently argued for a prohibition on management increasing their initial offer in the event of a higher 
bid, as a method to ‘reduce the scope for executives to take shareholders for too much of a ride’. Our sample 
contains only eleven transactions with more than one bidder in the PTP process, evenly distributed over deal 
types.
23 In these cases, the management initiated an MBO immediately after having been approached by an 
outside bidder.
24 White knight transactions were not found to be present among MBIs and IBOs. Five firms 
were in financial distress before the transaction and dependent on the benevolence of banks for the continuation 
of their operations. In three of these five cases, the banks had actually announced that they were terminating 
their investments, such that these firms had to seek a new life-line.  
    As expected from the numbers presented in Table 1, most of the larger deals involving an equity 
investment of more than GBP 100 million are IBOs.  
 
Company history 
    Panel B of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the recent company history leading up to the 
public to private transaction. On average, 19% of the sample firms experience some type of takeover pressure 
                                                
19 Goldstein (2000) applies a stricter classification that excludes seemingly hostile behavior that could be a simple price 
bargaining. He accepts ‘true’ hostility e.g. in case of litigation or the search for a white knight. We also use a stricter 
definition, namely a bid is hostile when the independent directors do not recommend the bid until at least a majority of 
the shares is in the hands of the hostile suitor. The main motivation of those directors to oppose is the fact that the 
individual  holdout  in  the cases  with  high  levels  of bid  acceptances  could  result in  a  highly  illiquid claim  for  the 
shareholder, once the firm is delisted. Under this second definition, only five cases in our sample are truly hostile. 
Three of the truly hostile transactions were observed for MBIs, while MBOs and IBOs both experienced one such deal. 
In the rest of the paper, our first definition of hostility will be used. 
20 The IBO of Esporta Plc is a well-documented example of a hostile public to private transaction. 
21 In the IBO of the Finelist Group Plc, the continued involvement of the management was crucial to the success of the 
buyout.  
22 Financial Times of May 15, 2003 
23 This provides some support for the hypothesis that PTPs generally involve listed corporations where shareholders 




(e.g. published rumors, takeover negotiations, or an offer for the shares) in the year prior to going private. For 
twelve firms, the PTP was not the first encounter with leveraged buyouts: they had undergone an LBO, an 
MBO, or in most cases, a divisional buyout in the past. The time between the first and the second transaction, 
was sufficiently large not to distinguish these firms from the others in the sample. Eleven firms were listed on 
the AIM when going private. Lower entry criteria, a less stringent regulatory regime and certain tax benefits for 
investing in AIM-firms
25 seriously reduce the burden of a listing on the AIM.  
    Almost 20% of our firms were floated less than five years before returning to private ownership. 
Lowenstein (1985) describes how a decline in stock markets following a hot issue market can be misused by 
founder-managers with large shareholdings. In the presence of a collective action problem amongst dispersed 
shareholders, they can take the company private at a depressed share price. The controversy stems from the 
impression that these types of transactions, in the short period that they reside on the public equity markets, 
transfer a disproportionally large share of the firm’s risk onto the claims of the outside shareholders for which 
they are not compensated by sharing in potential future improvements.  
Forty-eight firms engaged in asset restructurings in the five years leading up to the transaction, with 28 
restructurings  concentrated  in  the  last  three  years.  Firms  that  go  private  through  an  MBO  restructure 
significantly  less  frequently  over  the  three  years  prior  to  the  buyout.  This  is  not  surprising  given  that 
management can time the MBO.
26 If management undertakes major asset restructuring before the PTP, less 
additional value can be created after the PTP. Firms that restructured are more likely to go private through an 
IBO. Almost half the firms have given a profit warning at least once during the five years prior to their PTP. 
This provides some support for the fact that PTPs are important mechanisms to restructure poorly performing 
companies.  Table 3 also gives some data on board restructuring: in a quarter of the sample, the CEO had to 
depart in the three year period leading up to the PTP. A new CEO could, for instance, initiate a new strategy, 




    All  large  shareholders  (owning  share  stakes  of  at  least  3%)  were  categorized  into  one  of  nine 
categories: banks, investment and pension funds, insurance companies, industrial and commercial companies, 
individuals or families, the government, real estate companies, directors and venture capitalists. As documented 
above,  good  monitors  reduce  agency  and information  asymmetry problems.  More  specifically, Franks and 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 In the case of Hogg Robinson Plc, the prior bid was never officially tabled, but the resistance to the unofficial bid 
was so explicitly reported in the FT, that we categorized it as a defensive MBO. 
25 Inland Revenue considers companies traded on AIM as non-quoted for tax purposes. As a result of this, the taper 
relief, which reduces the taxable capital gains made on the sale of shares, is higher for AIM-quoted firms than for firms 
traded on the main market. 
26 Management may undertake restructuring and then make a buy-out offer before the benefits appear in the operating 
income. There is mixed evidence relating to the ability of management to manipulate earnings (De Angelo, 1986; Perry 
and Williams, 1994).  
27 An example from the sample is Mid Kent Holdings Plc, which went private as part of the restructuring program 
started by its new CEO. He intended to reduce the cost of capital and attract new capital to face the ever stronger 




Nyborg  (1996)  show  that  outside  blockholders  increase  the  probability  of  corporate  restructuring
28.  The 
Herfindahl  index  in  Table  4  shows  that there  is  large dispersion of  share stakes in the sample firms.  On 
average, the dominant shareholder owns 23.5% of the shares.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
    The nature of ownership is also an important dimension of the ownership structure (Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988). For example, Franks et al. (2001) find that institutional investors do not perform a monitoring 
role in the UK.  These institutional investors have a stake larger than 3% in almost 90% of the sample firms, 
and are the largest shareholder in 45% of the sample firms. The average holding of a substantial director-
shareholder is higher, at 12.5%. Prior to the PTP, venture capitalists were the largest shareholder in only three 
sample firms. Table 4 also presents the ownership data by deal type. Not surprisingly, in the firms that go 
private through an MBO, directors have larger ownership stakes (which is significantly different from the other 
types at the 1% level). The fact that directors of firms that go private through MBIs own 9.2% of the equity 
explains the high level of hostility in this type of transaction. Firms that go private through an IBO have lower 
equity stakes in the hands of directors (significantly lower at the 1% level), while the average stake controlled 
by an institution is considerably higher (at the 5% level of significance).  
  
Summary  
    The  descriptive  statistics  have  shown that  the sample  firms are not  drawn  from a  homogeneous 
population. MBOs typically are smaller firms, in which the directors possess a larger share of the firm’s equity. 
Their deal characteristics are generally characterized by a low hostility rate, and are occasionally driven by 
defensive measures. MBIs seem to be the exact counterpart. They are typically larger than MBOs, and seem to 
occur to occur in mature industries with high levels of free cash flow. On average they suffer from negative 
accounting performance, although this does not result in lower share price performance than for the other deal 
types. A relatively large proportion of MBIs involve hostile bids. IBOs are typically larger in size and seem to 
have  better  prospects  than  the  other  deal  types.  Their  ownership  structure  is  characterized  as  one  where 
directors  typically  own  a  small  proportion  of  the  shares  and  institutional  investors  are  the  dominant 
shareholders. The low cash-to-assets ratio seems to confirm that these firms are growth firms that may provide 




    The  shareholder  wealth  effects  in  buyout  research  are  generally  analyzed  through  two  different 
methodologies: a premiums analysis or an event study. Each method has its own advantages but they can 
jointly increase the power of econometric tests in PTP research.  
                                                
28 Phillips and Drew Fund Management, the UK’s third largest pension fund manager, takes an active stand towards the 





5.1 Event study methodology 
When  the  marketplace  is  rational,  the  informational  content  of  an  event  should  be  immediately 
reflected in asset prices (Campbell et al., 1997). The problem with LBO research is that the abnormal returns 
(ARs) may  be cross-sectionally incomparable, due to the non-uniformity of the information releases. Two 
subsamples can be distinguished. For the first subsample, the initial announcement is e.g. a recommended 
offer, a (hostile) tender offer, a firm intention, a mandatory offer triggered by the activation of rule nine of the 
City Code
29, or simply a notification of negotiations with a disclosed party. Consequently, investors know what 
type of deal has emerged (i.e. a leveraged PTP of the type MBO, MBI or IBO). For the second subsample, the 
information reaches the market in two stages: there is an initial notification of an imminent deal
30 (event 1), but 
the announcement disclosing the deal type only follows later (event 2). Some earlier research has taken the 
second date as the event date. It is clear that such results are biased due to the fact that the initial announcement 
(event 1) has a large effect on the share price and that event 2 could be regarded as a correction to event 1. 
Hence, a correct analysis of the shareholder wealth effects of the announcement of an MBO, MBI or IBO 
requires the definition of two events: 
 
Event 1: The very first announcement of takeover interest in the target firm that eventually leads to the PTP. 
Event 2: The very first announcement that identifies a going private proposal 
 
For 64% of our sample, events 1 and 2 coincide, but in 36%, the first announcement that starts the 
takeover process does not reveal the identity of the bidding party. For these firms, there are on average 51 
working days between the two events and this period does not vary substantially between MBOs, MBIs and 
IBOs.  Therefore,  we  add  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  returns  (CAARs)  for  events  1  and  2  (while 
excluding  overlap  in  event  windows).  Thus,  the  resulting  CAARs  of  the  two  subsamples  may  be  more 
comparable. 
 
Abnormal return estimation 
    ARs are calculated as the difference between the daily logarithmic returns corrected for dividends 
and stock splits, and the expected returns as predicted by the CAPM. The risk free rate is proxied by the three 
month treasury bill rate. The systematic risk is estimated over a period of 235 until 41 trading days prior to 
event 1 (day 0) using the FTSE All Shares Index. We correct the betas for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 
1979), apply a correction for regression to the mean and winsorize the betas at the 5% and 95% level.  
                                                                                                                                                        
as in the case of Sears Plc (Financial Times of December 24, 1998).  
29 Rule nine of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires that any person acquiring 30% or more of the voting 
rights is required to make a bid for the whole firm at the highest price paid by him for such shares in the previous 12 
months  (see Paul (1994) for a good review of the City Code). 
30 The City Code requires firms to disclose takeover negotiations when there are rumors, speculation, or an untoward 
price movement in the shares, if it can reasonably be determined to be caused by the bidders actions (Paul, 1994). 
Typically, this type of announcements does not embody more than the notification of a negotiation that ‘may or may 




    To test the null hypothesis that ARs are equal to zero, the parametric significance tests based on the 
variance of ARs in the estimation window are employed as in Kothari and Warner (1997). We also compute a 
nonparametric generalized sign test (see Cowan, 1992) to verify the robustness of the results (see Appendix 1). 
   
5.2 Analysis of premiums  
As an alternative to abnormal returns, many papers (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a,b; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
and Halpern et al., 1999) confine the measurement of wealth effects to the premium offered to the shareholders. 
The premium is the logarithm of the final price offered by the acquiring party divided by the share price before 
the first announcement (event 1+2 for the firms with information releases in stages): premium = ln (final price 
offered / pre-takeover share price). Under this specification, the measured premium impounds the informational 
value  of  any  announcement  made  during  the  going-private  process,  such  as  (amended)  bid  prices,  bidder 
competition,  and  the  identification  of  the  acquiring  party.  Thus,  the  premium  is  calculated  over  a  period 
comprising event windows 1 and 2 and the period in between.  
    There are several variations on the definitions of the ‘final price offered’ and the ‘pre-takeover share 
price’. As the final price, we take the final offer price of the winning bid (as do e.g. Harlow and Howe, 1993). 
Alternatively, Halpern et al. (1999) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) use the final traded price of the shares in the 
market before the delisting. They believe that the final traded price best reflects the market value of a bid 
comprising securities. However, as a PTP bid frequently contains payment in loan notes
31, the market value of 
such an offer cannot be inferred from the last traded share price. The reason is that the shares which are 
tendered are not sold to the bidder via the market. Instead, in the UK, shareholders can accept or reject a tender 
offer  for  their  shares  by  completing  and  returning  the  form  of  acceptances
32.  This  means  that  the  price 
movements  observed  in  the  market  are  speculative  only.  The  last,  true  assessment  of  the  final  bid  is  not 
observable from stock market data. 
    The difficulty with the benchmark ‘pre-takeover share price’ is the choice of the date. To allow for 
the share price run-up in the period preceding the first announcement of takeover interest, a period of twenty or 
forty days prior to the event date is chosen. We call this the ‘anticipation window’. Kaplan’s (1989a) LBO 
study  on  the  US  and  Goergen  and  Renneboog’s  (2004)  study  on  European  M&As both mention  that  the 
anticipation window spans approximately two months before the initial announcement. We also opt for forty 
working days.
33 The test statistics are given in Appendix 1.  
     
                                                
31 In UK buyouts, it is common for the bidder to offer the vendor the option to receive part of the payment in the form 
of loan notes. These notes are issued by the bidder and usually guaranteed by the sponsor of the buyout/buyin. The 
issuance of loan notes has advantages for both buyer and seller. Subject to Internal Revenue clearance, loan notes allow 
the seller to defer the tax charge arising from the sale. Due to the low rate of interest on loan notes in public offers, the 
buyer enjoys a lower cost of financing the acquisition.   
32 The form of acceptance is a document attached to the offer document, which shareholders have to complete and 
return to the receiving agent who is contracted by the bidder. In case of acceptance of the bid, the share certificates 
need to be enclosed.  
33  Some  studies  (e.g.  Kaplan,  1989b;  Asquith  and  Wizman,  1990;  and  Easterwood  et  al.,  1994)  use  hybrid 
methodologies which correct the premium for a benchmark return (e.g. the S&P500). However, these approaches boil 






6.1 Wealth effects of leveraged PTPs: abnormal returns and premiums.  
Panel A of Table 5 shows the premiums offered in all UK PTPs 1997-2003: a shareholder selling his 
shares to the final bidder will earn a premium of approximately 41%. This is in line with the US evidence from 
the 1980s where the premium ranges from 33% to 56% (Table 6). The most recent UK study by Weir et al. 
(2005a) shows a premium of 45% (Table 6). The premiums by transaction type are presented in panel B of 
Table  5.  IBOs, MBOs and  MBIs  generate premiums  of  43%,  42%  and  41%,  respectively. The difference 
(across anticipations windows of various length) is not statistically significant. Out of the 177 UK PTPs, 5 are 
in financial distress and have an important negative impact on the average premium. Excluding the 5 distressed 
firms increases the premium by 3.5% in Table 5. At the other extreme, the highest premium offered for a 
company was almost 180%
34.  
 
 [Insert Tables 5 and  6 about here] 
   
The wealth effects corrected for market reactions as captured by the CAARs are given in Table 7. The 
left  hand-side  of  the  table  presents  the  abnormal  returns  over  different  event  windows  for  the  first 
announcement  of  the PTP. Over the event window [-5,5], the CAARs amount to 26%, while over longer 
windows, the CAARs modestly increase to 29% (panel A of Table 7). Panel B shows that the wealth effects of 
the different types of PTP transactions are very similar. In contrast to M&A research, we find that there is little 
evidence of a price run-up due to leakage of information or trading on rumours (not reported in the tables). 
Although the CAARs are negative in the [-40,-6] event window, this is entirely caused by the financially 
distressed firms. The distressed firms reduce the wealth effects of the PTP announcements. Excluding these 
firms from our sample increases the CAARs by about 4%.  
 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
As pointed out in the methodology section, for some firms the first announcement of a PTP only relates 
to a takeover (event 1) and does not reveal the bidding party nor the type of PTP. The deal type follows in a 
subsequent press release (event 2). Figure 2 shows that it is important to consider both event 1 and 2 for firms 
in which the PTP announcement comes in stages. When only considering event 1 or event 2 – as traditional 
PTP research frequently has – the wealth effects are downward biased. The right hand-side of table 7 shows the 
combined effects of events 1 and 2. Table 8 enables us to compare our findings with those from the US and to 
conclude that UK PTPs generate market reactions that are largely similar to those in the US.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
                                                
34 In this specific case, Firth Rixson Plc, the buyer was an institutional investor who wanted to take the company 





6.2 The determinants of shareholder wealth gains from going private 
We test the hypotheses of Section 3 by estimating cross-sectional regressions using both the premium 
(with an anticipation window of 20 days) and the CAARs (with event window [-2,2]) as dependent variables. 
As explained above, we add the CAAR [-2,2] of event 2 to that of event 1 in case of information releases in 
stages. Although the full sample of PTPs consists of 177 observations, we exclude the 5 financially distressed 
firms as most of the hypotheses are not applicable to these companies. We briefly discuss the motives for 
distressed PTPs below. All models are tested for the presence of heteroscedasticity by means of a White test 
(White, 1980) and the results are not biased by multicollearity.  
The tax benefit hypothesis predicts that firms with higher pre-transaction tax bills, will benefit more 
from the interest deductibility associated with increased leverage. Hence, as in previous research (e.g. Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989; Kieschnick, 1998; and Halpern et al., 1999), we include taxes-to-sales and expect a positive 
relation between this variable and the wealth effects (see Table 9). However, taxes do not only depend on 
operating profitability but also on, for example, the increased depreciation resulting from investment policy  
and on various accounting policies. When taxes are low due to poor corporate performance, one may still 
expect that the taxes will increase as it is reasonable to assume that the PTP transactions will enhance future 
profitability. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between the wealth effects and an interaction term with 
taxes and a dummy variable equalling one for firms performing better than the median return on assets. The tax 
benefit also depends on how much additional debt the target firm can contract. In companies with a low debt-
equity ratio, the additional debt capacity is higher than in firms with a high proportion of debt. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relation between debt and the wealth effects (see Table 9).  
Table 10 reveals that the tax coefficients are not significant but that bidders are willing to pay higher 
premiums for firms with lower debt-equity ratios. The fact that the tax variables are not significant stands in 
contrast with the findings for US PTPs (e.g. Kieschnick, 1998; and Kaplan 1989b). Both Dicker (1990) and 
Weir et al. (2005a) point out that the tax advantages of financing firms with debt are smaller in the UK than in 
the US. Still, we conclude that higher premiums are paid for firms with low leverage which proxies both for the 
tax advantage of additional interest deductibility and for the ease of financing the takeover operation.  
[Insert Table 9 and 10 about here] 
 
     We hypothesize that the gains from going private arise from a stronger alignment of incentives in the 
post-transaction  private  firm.  Firms of which the managers  own only small equity stakes, are expected to 
benefit most from going private, as the buyout is expected to reduce potential agency problems. As mentioned 
above,  the  validity  of  this  relation  is  contested  for  higher  levels  of  managerial  ownership  when  agency 
problems induced by managerial entrenchment may dominate. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for 
those firms where management controls more than 25% of the firm’s equity, which corresponds to the highest 
quartile  of  managerial  ownership  of  the  sample.  This  threshold  is  also  equal  to  the  entrenchment  level 
documented by Morck et al. (1988). Tables 10 confirms the incentive realignment hypothesis: higher premiums 




of  very  high  managerial  equity  ownership  (>25%)  is  also  consistent  with  the  fact  that  this  share  block 
discourages other bidders (not belonging to the management) to make a counter bid (Stulz, 1988).  
    Under the control hypothesis, we expect that strong outside shareholders monitor the firm such that 
there is less scope for performance improvement once the firm is private. This is reflected in a lower premium 
and a lower CAAR. A strong outsider shareholder is defined as a shareholder controlling an equity stake of 3% 
of more in the pre-buyout firm and is an institutional investor (bank, pension fund, investment fund or trust, or 
insurance company), an individual or family, or a corporation.  
We  find  support  for  the  control  hypothesis,  especially  for  corporations  as  good  monitors.  The 
strongly negative relation for the outside control dummy variable of corporations show that lower levels of 
control by corporations in the pre-transaction firm are associated with larger expected wealth gains upon going 
private.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that  corporations  owning  large  equity  stakes  perform  a 
monitoring task. In contrast, the presence of family blockholders is not correlated with wealth gains in PTP 
transactions.  We  also  find  that  the  presence  of  significant  share  stakes  held  by  institutional  investors  is 
negatively  related  to  shareholder  wealth  gains  (Table  10).  This  negative  relation  may  be  the  result  of 
institutional shareholder activism which implies that lower performance improvements will be generated (as 
reflected in the premium and the CAARs) once the firm reaches its private status. However, interviews with 
institutional investors give more  credibility to  an alternative explanation: the low premiums in firms with 
institutional investors as the dominant shareholders reflect the fact that these institutional investors are locked 
in to poorly performing firms with little prospect of improvement. Hence, institutional investors contribute 
little monitoring value and are relieved to sell out (see also Franks et al, 2001).     
    According to the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis, firms that generate large free cash flows may 
waste resources. Exchanging equity for debt in a PTP will reduce the amount of resources under managerial 
discretion and will bond management. This is expected to make the firm’s capital budgeting decisions more 
efficient. Thus, we include the FCF-to-sales ratio as we expect that the higher the FCF, the more wealth gains 
can be created through a PTP. Our findings in Table 10 show that going private is not driven by the need to 
return FCF to the shareholders. 
Under  the  transaction  costs  hypothesis,  the  gains  from  going  private  are  primarily  caused  by  the 
elimination of the costs related to a stock exchange listing. We are only able to estimate the impact of the direct 
costs of maintaining a listing. As mentioned above, the listing costs for AIM-listed firms are lower than for 
firms listed on the official market of the LSE such that we expect that an AIM-listing is related to lower 
expected wealth effects. A listing on the AIM may also proxy for the lower indirect costs of a listing resulting 
from more flexible listing requirements. As predicted, the expected sign is negative for the premium regression.  
The takeover defence hypothesis predicts that firms go private as a defensive strategy. Thus, pressure 
from the  market for corporate control  is  expected  to force up the premiums paid in PTPs. In MBOs, the 
management will have to come with a high bid to pre-empt bidding by other contestants. As a proxy for 
takeover pressure, we take a dummy variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year 
leading up to the PTP announcement. We expect a positive sign. Table 10 reveals that the relation is indeed 




defence hypothesis as an explanation for the premium (as do Weir et al. (2005a) in their model explaining the 
decision to go private). 
    The  wealth  gains  from  going  private  may  also  be  caused  by  undervaluation.  The  higher  the 
discrepancy between the market value of a firm, and the potential value under private ownership, the larger will 
be the wealth gains in a PTP. For each type of PTP transaction, past performance is captured by share price 
returns over a one-year period prior to the PTP ending one month before the first announcement. The expected 
sign is negative for all deal types, although the magnitude of the effect is expected to be different per type. Due 
to information asymmetry, managers are best placed to identify undervaluation such that we expect that the 
impact of past share price performance on the premium and wealth effects is larger for MBOs and IBOs (which 
frequently retain the incumbent management) than for MBIs. Table 10 confirms the undervaluation hypothesis: 
lower share price performance in case of MBOs and IBOs leads to higher premiums and CAARs. The past 
share price performance for firms going private through an MBI is not significant.  
    We also include several control variables. When takeovers are contested, the expected premium and 
CAARs are higher than in friendly acquisitions. Obviously, hostility is more likely to occur in IBOs or MBIs. 
Maybe due to the small number of hostile bids in our sample (13 out of 172), Table 10 shows that hostility does 
not seem to influence the wealth effects. Bidder competition is also likely to push up the premium and CAARs, 
which is confirmed in model 1 of Table 10.   
    We  also  control  for  past  corporate  or  board  restructuring.  The  reason  is  the  outcome  of  such 
restructuring is already reflected in the share prices such that less additional shareholder value may be created 
through operating performance improvements. We include dummy variables which are equal to one if (i) a 
major asset restructuring has taken place within the five years prior to the announcement of the PTP and (ii) the 
CEO was removed within a two year period prior to the PTP. While the former variable is not significant, the 
second is strongly negative.  
    We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction took place prior or subsequent 
to 2000 in order to control for the equity market decline which started in March 2000. While our univariate 
statistics indicate that the premium is substantially higher (by more than 10%) in the pre-2000 period, this 
result is not upheld in the regression models.  
We conclude that this study weakly supports the tax benefits hypothesis in PTP transactions as a higher 
premium is paid for firms with low debt-equity ratios. Incentive realignment is also a source of value. We also 
report some evidence for the control hypothesis, but the most convincing results relate to the undervaluation 
hypothesis for MBOs and IBOs. Another reason to go private also seems to be the avoidance of the direct costs 
of maintaining a stock exchange listing. In contrast, going-private transactions are not initiated to curb free 
cash flows or to avoid unsolicited takeovers. The reported adjusted R-squared shows that the models explain 
about 25-30% of the sample variation in the dependent variable. Compared to previous research on PTPs’ 
wealth effects, the models fit the data reasonably well.  
From the cross-sectional analysis, we have excluded the five financially distressed firms as most of the 




to avoid bankruptcy or could even be regarded as a pre-packaged sale of bankrupt firms. Appendix 2 briefly 
describes these cases.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In the 1990s a vibrant, and economically important public to private (PTP) market developed in the 
UK. Nevertheless, to date there has been virtually no systematic research into the sources of wealth gains in 
UK going-private transactions. On this topic, most insights relate to the first wave of leveraged buyouts in the 
US during the ‘deal decade’ (the 1980s). This paper analyzes a large sample comprising the population of UK 
PTP transactions in the second going-private wave that started in the latter half of the 1990s. We employ two 
methods to capture the expected wealth effects of leveraged buyouts: a premium analysis and an event study. 
We find that on average, PTPs generate premiums of more than 40% and the wealth effects corrected for 
expected returns amount to almost 30%. 
In contrast to US research, the taxes paid by the target firm prior to the PTP transaction are not related 
to the wealth effects the deal is expected to generate. However, the fact that higher premiums are paid for firms 
with low leverage provides weak support for the tax benefits hypothesis. The unused debt capacity is likely to 
create a large additional tax shield.  
Our strongest result relates to the undervaluation hypotheses. Consistent with most US studies, this 
paper identifies a positive relation between pre-transaction undervaluation and the expected shareholder gains 
at the PTP transaction. This effect is found to be stronger for MBOs and IBOs (which mostly retain part of the 
incumbent management) than in MBIs, as the former are better placed to exploit undervaluation issues due to 
informational asymmetries. 
 The  potential  for  increased  incentive  realignment  in  the  private  firm  also  seems  an  important 
determinant of the shareholder wealth effects in PTP transactions as both the premium and CAARs are higher 
for  firms  with  lower  levels  of  managerial  ownership.  We  also  report  evidence  supporting  the  control 
hypothesis: in firms with stronger outside blockholders, the premiums and CAARs are lower. This negative 
relation is especially strong in firms with strong corporations as shareholders. This supports the fact that in 
firms  monitored  by  this  type  of  outside  shareholders,  there  is  less  scope  for  operating  performance 
improvements in the post-transaction period.  
We do not find any evidence sustaining the free cash flow hypothesis: firms are not taken private to 
reduce high free cash flows as Jensen (1989) predicts. This is consistent with most US studies and with the 
recent UK study by Weir et al. (2005a). While we are not able to test the total cost savings a firm can realize by 
abandoning a stock exchange listing, we test the relative effect of maintaining a listing on the AIM compared to 
the official market of the LSE. The negative relation between an AIM-listing and the wealth effects does not 
contradict the hypothesis that less value is created by abandoning the AIM-listing and its less expensive listing 
requirements.  
Prior takeover interest in the firm does not lead managers to pay more to take their firms private in 
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Appendix 1: Calculation of test statistics.  
To  test  for  the  significance  of  average  abnormal  returns  (AAR)  and  CAARs,  Kothari  and Warner  (1997) 
describe the followings test statistics.  
The one-day test statistic: 
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E1 and E2 refer to beginning and the end of the estimation window. T is the number of working days in the 
estimation  window, namely  195.  This one-day statistic follows a t-distribution. The CAR for security j is 
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Where t1 and t2 are the first and last day of the event window. The CAR over events 1 and 2, CAR
1+2, is 
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1 t t ￿ ￿  are the beginning and end dates of each event’s window W. The cross-
sectional average of the individual CARs (whether based on event 1, 2 or 1+2), is computed as follows for 
j=1,…,N: 
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where  AR s  is given by equation (A1) and  2 T  is the amount of days in the event window.  
 
The second parametric test is a simple t-test for the significance of the sample means
35. While the test statistics 
in Kothari and Warner (1997) compute the ARs’ variance from the estimation window, this simple t-test uses 
the variance of event-induced abnormal returns, calculated for each day in the event window individually: 
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where  t AAR  is defined as in equation (A3).  
                                                




The test statistic for CAAR is then computed as follows: 
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where  2 1, t t CAAR  is defined as in (A6),  2 1, , t t j CAR  is defined as in equation (A4) for event 1 and 2, and as in 
(A5) for event 1+2.  
 
We also estimate a non-parametric test: the generalized sign test which compares the proportion of positive 
abnormal returns around an event to the proportion from a period unaffected by the event (Cowan, 1992).  
Cowan (1992) shows that in ideal econometric conditions, Corrado’s (1989) rank test is more powerful 
than the generalized sign test. However Cowan also demonstrates that the rank test is misspecified under thin 
trading, while the generalized sign test remains correctly specified. As the securities in our sample are likely to 
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T E E ￿￿￿ , , 2 1 are defined as in equation (A2). The test statistic uses the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution of parameter  p ˆ . If we define  w as the number of positive  2 1, , t t j CAR  in the event window. The 











=                                                  (22) 
 
We test the null hypothesis that premiums are equal to zero as follows, where  AW j P ,  is the premium, calculated 
with anticipation window  AW , for firm j: 
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Appendix 2 : PTPs and financial distress 
 
Corum  Plc underwent  an  MBO  as  the  firm’s  results were  declining even after  the mortgage 
broking activities entered voluntary liquidation in 2001. The shareholder-managers who owned 39% of 
the business were only willing to commit further funds if they could take over the whole firm at a discount 
of 81% to the last price quoted and take the firm private.  
       
In 1997, UK Safety Group was at the limit of its banking facilities and was reported to be unable 
even to fund the redundancy payments needed as part of a restructuring program. The firm had a gearing 
ratio  of  about  400%.  Repeated  attempts  at  a  rights  issue  had  failed.  The  discounted  offer  made  by 
Alchemy  Partners  supported  by  the buy-out  team  was  agreed  by  shareholders. The bid  was  at £1.01 
million, a 50% discount on the traded share price. An additional investment of £7.5 million by Alchemy 
Partners cut the gearing level to a more comfortable level of 50%. The buyout specialist held 90% of the 
equity,  with  the  management  team  holding  the remaining  10%.  It  is  anticipated that  UK Safety  will 
investigate  non  UK  manufacturing  sources  in  order  to  reduce  costs. Finally,  it was reported that  the 
existing management are still in place in 2001 and have been re-energized by the buy-out. 
 
Heavy restructuring and dividend cuts dominated Industrial Control Services’ media exposure 
in  1995.  The  firm  first  needed  a  rights  issue  to  fund  its  working  capital  requirements  and  reduce 
borrowings. Although a new management team had consolidated the firm’s technological position after 
1997, the financial position of the firm had continued to deteriorate. The conclusion was, that the firm was 
simply too small to function in a market dominated by large competitors. Therefore, the firm ordered its 
bankers to look for an interested party for the purchase of all or part of the firm. The firm could not rely 
on the continuing support of its banks in the long term. The board also argued that another equity issue 
would not be practicable. The board decided to support an offer from Alchemy Partners in order to assure 
short-term solvency. They took the firm private at an 85% discount on the last quoted share price before 
the announcement of the offer, at 1 pence.  
 
Cedar Plc was founded in 1983 to provide software for the UK financial services industry. Sales 
of CRM systems in the US and the UK declined considerably with the burst of the IT bubble. The  board 
decided to investigate the options to ensure survival of the group. Discussions were held with potential 
purchasers of parts of Cedar Plc, but they did not elicit any binding offers. The profit warning preceding 
this loss in September 2001 took 93% off the share price. The worst results ever disclosed at the end of 
2001 put an end to any hopes for a re-start. Consequently, the board recommended the offer made by 
Redac, a vehicle set up for the acquisition by Alchemy Partners and debt-funded by the Bank of Scotland. 
Shareholders received 5 pence per share, a 57% discount to the share price of the day before the firm 
announced to enter discussions with a potential acquirer.  
 
  La Senza Plc never lived up to projections after it was floated in 1996. Already in its first year of 
being  listed,  the  retailer  was  plagued  by  delays  in  new  store  openings,  which  caused  it  to  miss  a 
significant amount of (Christmas-related) revenues. Instead of breaking even as expected, the firm made a 
loss (before tax) of ￿1.5 million on ￿18 million sales in this first year. The results after this dramatic first 
year did not improve. The banks were reluctant to renew La Senza’s borrowing facilities unless they were 
fully covered by cash collateral. Suzy Shier, the parent company, announced in January 1998 that it saw 
no other option but to find a buyer for the firm. It eventually sold its 60.2% holding in La Senza to Theo 
Paphitis and his family, owner of a rival lingerie retailer. This block of shares was transferred for the 
symbolic price of ￿1, and triggered rule 9 of the City Code, which requires an offer for the remaining 
shares of the firm. Paphitis offered 10 pence per share to the remaining shareholders, a 41% discount to 
the last share price before the company announced it was in discussions. La Senza lost 93% of its market 






Figure 1a: US public to private activity 
This figure shows the number of PTPs (left hand scale) and the value in million USD (right hand scale). Source: 















Figure 1b: UK public to private activity 
This figure shows the number of PTPs (left hand scale) and the value in million GBP (right hand scale). Source: 















Figure 1c: Continental European public to private activity 
This figure shows the number of PTPs (left hand scale) and the value in million Euro (right hand scale). Source: 
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Fig. 1d: Japanese Public to Private activity 
This figure shows the number of PTPs (left hand scale) and the value in Billion Yen (right hand scale). Source: 































































































































Figure 2: Shareholder wealth effects by type of announcement 
 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of firms going private in the UK from 1997-2003. The 
figure distinguishes 4 lines:  (1), shows the ‘all-in-one’ CAAR, for those announcements by which the bidder or the 
type of deal are identified, (2) shows the CAAR for those announcements in which the bidder is not revealed, (3) 
shows the average CAAR for those PTP announcements, for which earlier announced was made that a takeover was 
imminent without specifying the details of the type of deal (event 1 and 2 do not coincide), (4) shows an artificial 
CAAR constructed by summing the CAARs of event 1 (line 2) and event 2 (line 3). The CAARs are summed, 
provided that the announcement date of event 2 does not fall within the event window of event 1. The sample 
contains  177  observations.  Expected  returns  were  calculated  with  the  CAPM,  and  the  CAPM  parameters  were 
calculated from a market model regression, corrected for thin trading and mean reversion of the systematic risk. The 
beta parameters were trimmed at the 5% and the 95% distribution range. The estimation window was run from –235 
to –41 days before the first announcement of takeover, and the FTSE All Shares Index was used as the market index. 
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿CAAR of ‘all-in-one’ PTP announcement (event 1) (1) 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿CAAR of takeover announcement (event 1) but the identity of acquirer and type of deal is not yet 
announced (2). 
´ ´ ´ ´￿￿ CAAR of announcement of the identity of the acquirer and the type of deal for firms about which 
only partial information had been released earlier (event 2)  (3) 

























Table 1: Descriptive statistics on accounting, cash flow and share price-based measures 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics on accounting data and share price based measures. Source: 
Extel Cards, Financial Times, Annual reports and own calculations 
 
All sample firms (n = 177) 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Firm size:  Total sales (GBP million)  158.6  56.3  347.8  0.8  2574.2 
  Total assets (GBP million)  200.7  62  453.9  0.9  4065.7 
  Total market value (GBP m)  87  33.9  161.7  0.6  1370.7 
Performance:  Return on Assets (%)  3.7  5.6  19.2  -190  36 
Leverage and taxes  Debt to equity (%)  34.5  12.1  53  0  284.5 
  Taxes (% of sales)  2.5  1.8  2.8  -2.4  18.7 
Cash flow and retention  Cash to assets (%)  11  4.9  16.1  0  95.9 
  Free cash flow (% of assets)  5  5.9  16.6  -100  48.1 
              
MBO (137 firms)             
Firm size:  Total sales (GBP million)  103.5  52.1  186.6  1.5  1815.8 
  Total assets (GBP million)  153.2  58.6  337.7  0.9  3296 
  Total market value (GBP m)  62.5  30.9  91.1  0.6  655.5 
Performance:  Return on Assets (%)  3.9  6.1  21.1  -190  36 
Leverage and taxes  Debt to equity (%)  32.4  9  53  0  284.5 
  Taxes (% of sales)  2.7  2  2.8  -0.6  18.7 
Cash flow and retention  Cash to assets (%)  11.9  6.6  16.9  0  95.9 
  Free cash flow (% of assets)  5.4  5.9  17.3  -100  48.1 
              
MBI (18 firms)             
Firm size:  Total sales (GBP million)  299.2  67.1  580.4  8.4  1889.8 
  Total assets (GBP million)  232.9  65.6  408.5  12.7  1608.4 
  Total market value (GBP m)  112.3  23.6  202.9  6.9  738.7 
Performance:  Return on Assets (%)  -1.0  1.8  12.7  -47.7  9 
Leverage and taxes  Debt to equity (%)  48.1  28  66.2  0  257 
  Taxes (% of sales)  1.1  0.3  1.6  -0.3  5.2 
Cash flow and retention  Cash to assets (%)  10.5  2  16.5  0  50 
  Free cash flow (% of assets)  0.7  1.9  15.9  -48.5  30.9 
              
IBO (22 firms)             
Firm size:  Total sales (GBP million)  387.1  121.7  651.2  0.8  2574.2 
  Total assets (GBP million)  469.6  164.5  872.8  10.1  4065.7 
  Total market value (GBP m)  218.8  110.3  330.8  8.1  1370.7 
Performance:  Return on Assets (%)  5.7  6  8.3  -18.7  24.9 
Leverage and taxes  Debt to equity (%)  37  20.4  39.8  0  136.6 
  Taxes (% of sales)  2.3  1.5  3.2  -2.4  12.3 
Cash flow and retention  Cash to assets (%)  5.9  2.6  7.9  0  28.3 





Table 2: Average share price performance in the year prior to PTP and performance since flotation.  
 
Panel A shows the share price performance in the year prior to the PTP. The share price performance is measured from 
–300 to –41 days before the first announcement of takeover interest that eventually led to the PTP. The performance of 
the  FTSE  All  Shares  Index  was  calculated  in  the  same  way  for  each  individual  firm.  Panel  B  shows  the  market 
capitalization for those sample firms that were floated after 1993, at the floatation date and at the first announcement 
data  of  the  PTP  transaction.  ***,  **,  *  stand  for  statistical  significance  at  the  1,  5  and  10%  level.  Source:  Own 
calculations 
 
Panel A: Average market-adjusted share return by year 
Year  Firms 
Share return –  
FT All share return (%)  t-value 
FT All Shares return 
(%)  t-value 
1997  7  -11.9  -1.796  15.1  6.360
*** 
1998  27  -36.4  -5.863
***  22.9  18.423
*** 
1999  46  -31.8  -7.549
***  5.6  5.864
*** 
2000  42  -6.8  -2.644
**  11.1  12.557
*** 
2001  32  -1.2  -1.169  -2.0  -1.920
* 
2002  20  4.6  -0.981  -16.3  -13.085
*** 
2003  3  -7.8  -0.592  -19.3  -7.838
*** 
           
Panel B: Market cap (in GBP millions) of sample firms floated since 1993, measured at the floatation and at 
the first announcement date of the PTP 
Market cap  
at flotation date  
Market cap  
at offer price of PTP 
Year of 
PTP  Firms  Difference  Return (%) 
84.6  86.0  1997  2  1.4  1.7 
543.9  483.2  1998  10  -60.7  -11.7 
508.0  532.4  1999  14  24.4  4.8 
744.0  809.5  2000  7  65.5  8.8 
332.3  344.7  2001  5  12.4  3.7 
771.7  346.4  2002  6  -425.3  -55.1 
2984.5  2602.3  Total  44  -382.2  -12.8 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics on deal characteristics and company history 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics on deal characteristics and company history by PTP type. Hostile is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the first bid was rejected. Bidder competition equals 1 if there was more than 1 bidder. 
Defensive  transaction  equals  1  if  the  PTP  was  enacted  to  protect  against  unwanted  possible  takeover Financial 
Distress equals 1 if the firm depends on the benevolence of banks to survive. LBO equals 1 if the firm was subject to 
an LBO before. AIM equals 1 if the firm is listed on the Alternative Investment Market. IPO 3(5) equals 1 if firm 
was floated 3 (5) years before the PTP. Restructuring 3 (5) equals 1 if the firms’ assets were restructured 3 (5) years 
before the PTP. Profit warning 3 (5) equals 1 if the firm issued a profit warning 3 (5) years before PTP. CEO 3 (5) 
equals 1 if CEO was replaced 3 (5) years before PTP. Source: Annual reports, Financial Times, Regulatory News 
Service and own calculations. 
 
 
All sample firms 
(177 firms)   137 MBOs  18 MBIs  22 IBOs 
Panel A: Deal characteristics  Number  %  Number  %  Number  %  Number  % 
                  
Hostile bid  13  7.3  6  4.4  5  27.8  2  9.1 
Bidder competition  11  6.2  8  5.8  1  5.6  2  9.1 
Defensive action  4  2.3  4  2.9  0  0.0  0  0.0 
Financial distress  5  2.8  3  2.2  1  5.6  1  4.5 
Deal equity value > GBP 100 m  52  29.4  36  26.3  4  22.2  12  54.5 
Deal equity value between GBP 
50 m and 100 m  37  20.9  32  23.4  2  11.1  2  9.1 
                  
Panel B: Company history                         
                  
Prior acquisition interest  34  19.2  26  19.0  6  33.3  2  9.1 
LBO  12  6.8  10  7.3  0  0.0  2  9.1 
AIM  11  6.2  9  6.6  2  11.1  0  0.0 
IPO 3  17  9.6  11  8.0  3  16.7  3  13.6 
IPO 5  32  18.1  26  19.0  3  16.7  3  13.6 
Restructuring 3  28  15.8  17  12.4  4  22.2  7  31.8 
Restructuring 5  48  27.1  35  25.5  4  22.2  9  40.9 
Profit warning 3  67  37.9  50  36.5  9  50.0  8  36.4 
Profit warning 5  81  45.8  59  43.1  12  66.7  10  45.5 
CEO 3  44  24.9  35  25.5  4  22.2  5  22.7 





Table 4: Descriptive statistics on substantial shareholdings 
This  table  shows the  substantial shareholdings  (>5%)  by  category  of owner. It should be noted that the means, 
medians and standard deviations are calculated conditional on the presence of a stake of that specific shareholder 
type. The Herfindahl index captures the concentration of the shareholdings. Dominance shows in which percentage 
of the firms the shareholder of a particular type is the largest shareholder. Dominant shareholder shows the average 
percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder regardless of his category.  
 
All Firms  mean (%)  median (%)  std. dev (%)  presence (%)  dominance (%) 
Banks  3.4  0.0  5.5  40.1  7.9 
Investm. and pension funds   10.5  8.9  8.9  89.8  34.5 
Insurance companies  2.2  0.0  3.5  37.3  3.4 
Industrial and commercial co’s  2.2  0.0  7.4  14.1  6.2 
Individual or family  3.7  0.0  10.1  31.6  6.2 
Real estate funds  1.6  0.0  6.0  8.5  5.6 
Directors  12.5  4.2  17.6  58.2  32.2 
Venture capital and private equity  1.6  0.0  4.9  14.1  4.0 
           
Herfindahl index  11.0  6.6  12.1  na  na 
Dominant shareholder   23.5  18.7  16.0  na  100.0 
            
MBO           
Banks  3.3  0.0  5.3  38.7  8.0 
Investm. and pension funds  9.8  8.6  7.6  89.8  32.1 
Insurance companies  2.2  0.0  3.4  37.2  2.9 
Industrial and commercial co’s  1.8  0.0  5.9  12.4  5.8 
Individual or family  3.5  0.0  9.2  34.3  5.1 
Real estate funds  1.6  0.0  6.1  8.0  5.1 
Directors  14.1  7.6  18.4  63.5  37.2 
Venture capital and private equity  1.3  0.0  4.3  12.4  3.6 
           
Herfindahl index  11.0  6.6  12.1  na  na 
Dominant shareholder   23.4  18.6  15.9  na  100.0 
            
MBI           
Banks  4.1  0.0  7.6  38.9  11.1 
Investm. and pension funds  8.6  7.0  6.3  88.9  16.7 
Insurance companies  1.9  0.0  3.5  27.8  0.0 
Industrial and commercial co’s  7.5  0.0  15.9  27.8  16.7 
Individual or family  6.8  0.0  18.2  27.8  16.7 
Real estate funds  3.1  0.0  8.0  16.7  11.1 
Directors  9.2  1.6  15.9  50.0  22.2 
Venture capital and private equity  2.4  0.0  6.5  16.7  5.6 
           
Herfindahl index  14.1  9.3  14.2  na  na 
Dominant shareholder   28.1  23.5  18.8  na  100.0 
            
IBO           
Banks  3.8  1.7  4.5  50.0  4.5 
Investm. and pension funds  16.0  13.5  14.7  90.9  63.6 
Insurance companies  2.8  0.0  4.2  45.5  9.1 
Industrial and commercial co’s  0.6  0.0  1.8  13.6  0.0 
Individual or family  2.0  0.0  5.1  18.2  4.5 
Real estate funds  0.6  0.0  2.8  4.5  4.5 
Directors  5.3  0.0  10.2  31.8  9.1 
Venture capital and private equity  2.8  0.0  6.8  22.7  4.5 
           
Herfindahl index  8.6  5.8  10.2  na  na 




Table 5: Premiums by type of leveraged PTP and by anticipation window 
 
The premiums (%) are calculated as follows:  ) - / (     Premium price share takeover pre offered price final LN = . The 
anticipation window is the number of days prior to the announcement date of the leveraged PTP. Obs. stands for the 
number  of  observations  (firms). 
***, 
**  and 
*  stand  for  statistical  significance  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  level, 
respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Panel A: Premiums by anticipation window (sample = 177 firms) 
                  
Anticipation 
window  Obs.  Mean  t-value    Min. 
25% 
quartile  Median 
75% 
quartile  Max. 
                   
1 day  177  37.0  9.247
***    -96.3  20.8  35.5  55.6  175 
10 days  177  41.1  9.889
***    -96.3  22.5  38.7  60.2  179.7 
20 days  177  41.0  9.993
***    -96.1  25.0  39.5  58.7  171.1 
40 days  177  40.1  8.786
***    -96.9  25.7  38.5  56.9  171.1 
                  
Panel B: Premiums by type of PTP   
                  
Deal type  Anticipation 
window     Obs.      mean (%)    t-value   
                   
MBO  20 days    137      40.6    8.314
***   
  40 days          39.1    7.579
***   
MBI  20 days    18      42.0    4.382
***   
  40 days          38.8    2.957
**   
IBO  20 days    22      42.6    3.970
**   
  40 days          47.4    2.957





Table 6: International evidence on premiums paid in public to private transactions 
 
This table shows the studies that estimate the shareholder wealth effects using a premiums analysis. ALL = all going 
private deals. MBO = MBO deals only 
￿
￿































MBO  30 days  28  56.0% 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989)  1980-87 
US 
 







MBO  20 days  15  42.9% 





MBO  2 months  76  42.3% 
 




ALL  1 day  47 
 
37.9% 




ALL  20 days  121  44.9% 
Travlos and Cornett (1993)  1975-83 
US 
 
ALL  1 month  56 
 
41.9% 





MBO  20 days  184  32.9% 
 












Table 7: CAARs for leveraged PTPs 
 
This table shows the CAARs of firms going private in the UK over the period 1997-2003 for different event windows. 
Event  1  is  the  first  date  of  any  takeover  interest  that  eventually  leads  to  the  PTP.  For  36%  of  the  sample,  the 
information on the PTP arrives in stages: a first announcement of takeover interest (event 1) and a second one in which 
the bidding party is revealed and it becomes clear that the bid is a leveraged buyout (event 2). Event 1+2 combines the 
CAARS of both events provided there is no overlap in event windows. Expected returns were calculated with the 
CAPM corrected for thin trading and mean reversion. The betas were trimmed at the 5% and the 95% level of the 
distribution. The estimation window spans transaction days –235 to –41 whereby 0 stands for the first announcement 
date.  The FTSE All Shares Index is the market index. The details on the calculation of the test statistics are given in 
Appendix 1. Obs. stands for the number of observations (firms).
***, 
** and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Panel A: CAARs by event window (Observations = 177) 
  Event 1  Event 1+2 
Window  CAAR (%)  Simple t-stat.  K&W t-stat Gen. sign test CAAR (%) Simple t-stat  K&W t-stat  Gen. sign test 
                 
[-1,0]  22.68  13.889
***  66.111
***  13.522




                 
[-5,5]  25.53  11.573
***  30.908
***  13.673




                 
[-40,40]  29.28  10.439
***  12.335
***  13.673




                 
Panel B: CAARS by deal type 
  Event 1  Event 1+2 
Deal type  Window  Mean (%)  t-value  Median  Deal type  Mean (%)  t-value  Median 
                 
MBO  [-1,0]  22.7  14.444
***  18.3  MBO  24.3  10.724
***  21.5 
(Obs.=137)  [-5,5]  25.7  11.414
***  24.8    28.2  9.030
***  27.9 
  [-40,40]  30.8  12.252
***  29.7    33.4  8.575
***  31.3 
                 
MBI  [-1,0]  22.6  5.536
***  18.3  MBI  27.7  6.194
***  26.3 
(Obs.=18)  [-5,5]  24.4  6.345
***  19.8    27.5  5.104
***  22.3 
  [-40,40]  36.1  5.676
***  31.5    37.7  4.636
***  43.5 
                 
IBO  [-1,0]  23.73  2.597
**  21.64  IBO  30.21  2.622
**  23.62 
(Obs.=22)  [-5,5]  26.24  2.303
*  24.39    29.88  2.672
**  32.53 
  [-40,40]  27.39  2.263
*  29.11    32.00  2.785
**  33.54 





Table 8: Previous evidence of CAARs in public to private transactions 
 
This table shows papers that estimate shareholder wealth effects via event studies. ALL = all going private deals. 
MBO = MBO deals only. All CAARs are statistically significance at the 1% level. ￿
￿
 
Study  Sample 
period/ 
country  
Type  of 
Deal 
Event window  N   CAAR 
 





















Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987)  1982-85 
US 








Lehn and Poulsen (1989)  1980-87 
US 







Amihud (1989)  1983-86 
US 
 
MBO  -20,0 days  15  19.60% 
 
Kaplan (1989)  1980-85 
US 
 
MBO  -40,60 days  76  26.00% 
 











Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1991)  1980-88 
US 
 











MBO  -1,0 days 






Frankfurter and Gunay (1992)  1979-84 
US 







Travlos and Cornett (1993)  1975-83 
US 





























Goh, Gombola, Liu and Chou (2002)  1980-96 
US 

















Abbreviation  Expected 
sign  Result 
 





Taxes * performance (1 if 
ROA>median)  -  Not significant 
 
H1: Tax Benefit 
Debt/equity ratio  -  Negative 
 












Corporation blockholder   -  Strongly negative 
 
H3: Control 
Family blockholder  -  Not significant 
 
H4: Free Cash Flow 
 
Free cash flow  +  Not significant 
 
H5: Transaction costs 
 







H6: Takeover defence 
 






       
Share performance * MBO  - 
  Strongly negative 
Share performance * MBI  -  Not significant 
H7: Undervaluation 
Share performance * IBO  -  Strongly negative 
       
Hostile bid (1=yes)  -  Not significant 
CEO was removed past 2 
years (1=yes)  -  Strongly negative 
Corporate restructuring in 
past 5 years (1=yes)  -  Not significant 
Pre-2000  +  Not significant 
Control variables 












Table 10: Cross-sectional regressions for premiums/CAARs in PTP transactions. 
 
This table shows the cross-sectional regressions estimating the determinants of the premiums/CAARs in PTP 
transactions. The anticipation window for the premiums is 20 days. The event date is the first announcement 




* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations 
￿
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Dep. Var = premium  Dep. Var = CAAR 
Variable  Par. Estimate  t-value  Par. Estimate  t-value 
Constant  0.5806  7.119
***  0.4363  5.169
*** 
IBO (1=yes)  -0.0066  -0.128  -0.0396  -0.739 
MBI (1=yes)  0.0073  0.148  0.0254  0.494 
Taxes         
Taxes * performance (1 if ROA>median)   -0.6935  -0.932  0.0127  0.016 
Taxes (as % of sales)  -0.1713  -0.239  -1.133  -1.526 
Debt/equity ratio  -0.0708  -2.305
**  -0.0295  -0.927 
Incentive realignment         
Managerial ownership   -0.0016  -2.143
**  -0.0027  -3.378
*** 
Managerial stake >25% (1=yes)  -0.0482  -1.666
*  -0.046  -1.538 
Ownership and control         
Institutional blockholder >5% (yes =1)  -0.0794  -2.290
**  -0.0648  -1.804
* 
Corporation blockholder >5% (yes =1)  -0.0807  -2.808
***  -0.0920  -3.094
*** 
Family blockholder >5% (yes =1)  -0.0121  -0.389  0.0365  1.136 
Free cash flow         
Free cash flow  0.0130  0.133  0.0463  0.458 
Transaction costs         
AIM listing (1=yes)  -0.0383  -1.922
*  0.0026  0.127 
Takeover defense         
Prior takeover interest (1=yes)  0.0549  1.620  0.0106  0.301 
Undervaluation         
Share performance * MBO  -0.1327  -3.679
***  -0.1039  -2.782
*** 
Share performance * MBI  -0.1500  -1.251  0.0272  0.219 
Share performance * IBO  -0.2702  -1.954
*  -0.5615  -3.924
*** 
Return on assets  -0.0006  -0.44  0.0011  0.800 
Control variables         
Hostile bid (1=yes)  -0.0118  -0.24  -0.0762  -1.495 
Bidder competition (1=yes)  0.1308  2.562
**  -0.1026  -1.041 
CEO was removed past 2 years (1=yes)  -0.1025  -3.282
***  -0.1301  -4.025
*** 
Corporate restructuring in past 5 years (1=yes)  -0.0053  -0.165  0.0481  1.441 
Size (ln of total assets)  0.0041  0.307  0.0014  0.101 
PTP occurred pre-2000 (1=yes)  -0.0321  -1.037  -0.008  -0.249 
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
F-value  3.390
***    2.854
***   
R-squared  0.419    0.378   
Adjusted R-squared  0.295    0.245   
￿
￿